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Quantum Economics, Newtonian Economics, and Law

William H.J. Hubbard †
Just as Newtonian mechanics breaks down when we look at the
constituent pieces of our universe—subatomic particles—neoclassical
economics breaks down when we look at the constituent pieces of our
society—individual people. At the scale of subatomic particles, quantum mechanics provides new foundations for understanding the physical world; at the scale of individual decisionmaking, behavioral economics promises new foundations for understanding the social, economic, and legal worlds. As this Article explains, this analogy between
Newtonian and quantum physics, on the one hand, and neoclassical
and behavioral economics, on the other hand, has much to reveal
about law and economics.
With the help of numerous examples of key finding in behavioral
law and economics, I take three principles from quantum mechanics
(the uncertainty principle, the correspondence principle, and the quantum principle) and show how analogous principles in economics help
illuminate the future trajectory of law and economics. I then seek to
accelerate this trajectory by proposing an agenda for strengthening
behavioral law and economics through a stronger grounding in theory,
and specifically a “quantum” theory of decisionmaking.
Along the way, the analysis leads me to challenge some common
misconceptions about law and economics: behavioral and neoclassical
approaches to law and economics are not rivals, but partners; simplistic and artificial assumptions about human behavior remain a problem in law and economics, but most acutely in behavioral law and
economics; and the notion that neoclassical economics promotes a deregulatory agenda and behavioral economics promotes a proregulatory agenda is, as often as not, exactly backwards.

Professor of Law and Ronald H. Coase Teaching Scholar, University of Chicago Law School. I presented an early version of ideas in this paper at the
2015 Coase Lecture at the University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful
for comments from Lee Fennell, Jonathan Masur, Richard McAdams, attendees of the 2015 Coase Lecture at the University of Chicago Law School.
Patrick Fuster provided valuable research assistance. I thank the CoaseSandor Institute for Law & Economics and the Paul H. Leffman Fund for research support.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional, neoclassical approach to law and economics is under attack. The challenger is behavioral law and economics. A tsunami
of empirical findings documenting how individuals behave in puzzling
and sometimes paradoxical ways has washed away the foundations of
the neoclassical approach, which was built upon simplistic assumptions about human rationality.
A century ago, Newtonian mechanics was under attack. The challenger was quantum mechanics. Astounding empirical findings that
documented how matter behaved in puzzling and sometimes paradoxical ways undermined the Newtonian framework, which had described
the physical world in simplistically deterministic terms.
This analogy between quantum physics and Newtonian physics, on
the one hand, and behavioral economics and neoclassical economics,
on the other hand, reflects the similarity of the underlying paradigm
shifts in physics and economics. Just as Newtonian mechanics breaks
down when we look at the constituent pieces of our universe (subatomic particles), neoclassical economics breaks down when we look at the
constituent pieces of our society: individual people. In this way, just as
quantum mechanics challenged the nano-foundations for Newtonian
mechanics, behavioral economics challenges the nano-foundations for
neoclassical economics. And just as quantum mechanics superseded
Newtonian mechanics, we might expect that neoclassical economics is
headed for the same fate as Newtonian physics.
But which fate is that? If an engineer or a scientist wants to build
a state-of-the-art bridge, design a supersonic jet engine, or extract a
core sample from under two miles of Antarctic ice, she doesn’t use
quantum physics. She uses Newtonian physics. She might not even
know quantum physics, although she probably knows enough quantum physics to know that Newtonian mechanics is more-or-less wrong.
How can this be?
The reason is the “Correspondence Principle,” which describes the
relationship between quantum mechanics and Newtonian mechanics.
The concept is twofold: On the one hand, quantum mechanics has
shown us that many of the premises and predictions of classical mechanics are wrong. But on the other hand, while individual particles
may behave in ways that defy classical theory, it is also the case that
when we aggregate those individual particles up to the scale of human
society, classical physics still gets the job done most of the time. Newtonian physics builds bridges, but we need quantum physics to have
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iPhones. 1 The Correspondence Principle reminds us that, as a practical matter, quantum mechanics and Newtonian mechanics are not
competing visions of the universe, but complementary methods of understanding the physical world.
One central claim of this Article is that the analogy between physics and economics can be extended to this concept of correspondence: I
argue that an equivalent Correspondence Principle describes the relationship between behavioral (“quantum”) economics and neoclassical
(“Newtonian”) economics. The future of law and economics will not be
a process of the behavioral replacing the neoclassical. The shift will be
more subtle. The question law and economics faces today is about the
proper division of labor between neoclassical and behavioral approaches. When is law trying to build a bridge? When is law trying to
build an iPhone?
Now—the behavioral approach to law and economics is under attack, too. The challenge here comes from within the behavioral sciences. In recent years, the social sciences have been rocked by a litany of
revelations that prominent, sometimes landmark, empirical findings
could not be replicated in later studies. The seminal results appeared
to have been the product of poor experimental design or random
chance. This crisis of credibility has nowhere been more acute than in
behavioral psychology, a field that has supplied many of the insights
upon which behavioral law and economics has relied. 2 In his bestselling book on behavioral psychology and economics, Thinking Fast
and Slow, Daniel Kahneman devoted an entire chapter to “priming
effects,” 3 citing twelve articles finding that subtle, unconscious primes
have dramatic effects on behavior—for example, exposure to words
associated with old age (e.g., Florida, bald, gray, wrinkle) leads people
to walk more slowly, and smiling while reading leads people to find
cartoons funnier. 4 These results, striking and numerous, led Kahneman to conclude, “The results are not made up, nor are they statistical

See Part II.B, infra.
See, e.g., Open Science Collaboration, Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science, 349 SCIENCE 943 (Aug. 28, 2015) (attempting to replicate
the results of 100 studies published in three top psychology journals and observing successful replication of only 36.1% to 47.4% of results, depending on
criteria).
3 Daniel Kahneman, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (Farrar, Straus and Giroux
2011).
4 Id. ch. 4.
1
2

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2926548

4

William H.J. Hubbard

[2017

flukes. You have no choice but to accept that the major conclusions of
these studies are true.” 5
Yet over the past few years, a series of careful studies have failed
to replicate these key findings. 6 For example, seventeen independent
labs attempted to replicate the finding that smiling would lead individuals to find comics funnier, and not one found evidence of an effect. 7 A meta-analysis of all twelve of the priming studies cited in
Thinking Fast and Slow reached the opposite conclusion from the
book: “You should not accept any of the conclusions of these studies as
true.” 8 Prominent behavioral researchers, including Kahneman himself, have described this replicability crisis as a “train wreck” and
called for reforms to empirical methods in experimental research. 9
With confidence in decades’ worth of empirical findings in behavioral science shaken, one might ask whether the ascendancy of behavioral economics in law should be reconsidered. No: there are simply too
many compelling—and well replicated—findings from behavioral economics for law and economics not to embrace those insights. Instead,
we should ask: What is the path forward for behavioral law and economics, a field which established itself by casting doubt on the assumptions of neoclassical economics, but which now faces a healthy
dose of skepticism about its own premises?
Here, again, the analogy to quantum mechanics becomes useful.
To the Correspondence Principle I add two more concepts from quan-

Id. at 57.
The pivotal study was Stéphane Doyen, Olivier Klein, Cora-Lise Pichon, and
Axel Cleermans, Behavioral Priming: It’s all in the Mind, but Whose Mind?, 7
PLOS ONE 1 (Jan. 2012) (finding no evidence to support the result that exposure to words associated with old age leads people to walk slower).
7 Ulrich Shimmack, Moritz Heene, and Kamini Kesavan, Reconstruction of a
Train Wreck: How Priming Research Went off the Rails, REPLICABILITY-INDEX
BLOG (Feb. 2, 2017), available at https://replicationindex.wordpress.com/2017/
02/02/reconstruction-of-a-train-wreck-how-priming-research-went-of-therails/.
8 Id.
9 Daniel Kahneman, A Proposal to deal with questions about priming effects
(open email dated Sept. 26, 2012 9:32 AM), cited in Ed Yong, Nobel laureate
challenges psychologists to clean up their act, NATURE (Oct. 3, 2012), available
at
http://www.nature.com/news/nobel-laureate-challenges-psychologists-toclean-up-their-act-1.11535; Ulrich Shimmack, Moritz Heene, and Kamini
Kesavan, supra note 7, at comment by Daniel Kahneman (Feb. 14, 2017) (“I
placed too much faith in underpowered studies.”).
5
6
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tum physics that suggest useful analogies in economics, which I label
the Uncertainty Principle and the Quantum Conjecture. 10
The Uncertainty Principle is the most familiar concept from quantum physics. It reflects the idea that it is impossible to observe a particle without affecting the particle. The analogous concept in social
sciences is often called the “observer effect,” and I explore how it plays
out in experimental work on the endowment effect and social (otherregarding) preferences—cognitive phenomena of central importance in
behavioral law and economics. The Uncertainty Principle for law and
economics unpacks the methodological limitations inherent in much
existing work upon which behavioral law and economics relies. By doing so, it helps clarify the way to more robust and policy-relevant experimental work. Much of this work is already underway, and I identify examples of key innovations scholars in behavioral law and economics have made.
One of the key moves for behavioral law and economics that I advocate is to connect empirical findings to a theory of human decisionmaking. A theory that incorporates and makes coherent the many
results from the laboratory lays the groundwork for predicting how
behavioral effects will manifest outside the lab—i.e., in the real-world
settings relevant to legal policy.
The Quantum Conjecture is my tentative step toward such a theory. In physics, the Quantum Principle says that matter and energy
cannot always be subdivided; they exist in discrete, indivisible chunks
called quanta. This provides a rough but powerful analogy: my Quantum Conjecture for behavioral law and economics is that human attention cannot be perfectly and infinitely divided (as traditional models of economic decisionmaking assume), but can only be parceled out
in discrete chunks. As I will explain, a model of decisionmaking as rationing a limited number of packets of mental effort out among a multitude of important choices may help unify various behavioral phenomena that we currently treat as distinct (e.g., the “certainty effect”
and “choice overload”) and legal phenomena from diverse areas (e.g.,
“unfair prejudice” in evidence and the “precautionary principle” in
regulation).
As I will note at greater length below as well, see note 15, infra, analogies
between law and physics are not new, although the specific applications I
identify and lessons I draw from them are. The one exception is that Tom
Ulen alluded to the Correspondence Principle (although not in so many
words) some years ago. See Thomas S. Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in
the Future of Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 433, 462. I discuss his brief but incisive
take on this idea below. See notes 75–75, infra.
10
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There is one more contribution that the analogy to physics offers.
By casting law and economics in a different light, it overturns some
prevalent misconceptions about law and economics. I have already
challenged the notion that behavioral and neoclassical approaches are
rivals rather than two faces of the same coin. To this I add that behavioral law and economics, not just neoclassical economics, must face up
to the critique that it relies on simplistic and artificial assumptions
about human behavior. Finally, I reject the stereotype that neoclassical economics is ideologically right-wing or anti-regulatory and that
behavioral economics is ideologically left-wing or pro-regulatory. (Indeed, I will argue that there is a sense in which the reverse is true.)
In short, the contributions of this Article are threefold. First, the
analogy to quantum and Newtonian physics, and specifically the Uncertainty and Correspondence Principles, helps to organize and reframe the relationship between behavioral and neoclassical law and
economics. Second, the Quantum Conjecture suggests a direction toward more unified and coherent theory in behavioral law and economics. This is a necessary next step for the field to overcome concerns
that its mish-mash of empirical findings yields indeterminate behavioral predictions, and is therefore not policy-relevant. Third, delving
deeper into the analogy reveals further lessons for law and economics,
lessons which I hope will disrupt some of the generalizations about the
field that we’ve become too comfortable with.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows: In Part II, I introduce the three principles from quantum physics that will frame this
Article: the Uncertainty Principle, the Correspondence Principle, and
the Quantum Principle. In Part III, I sketch central features of neoclassical economics and behavioral economics, focusing on what will be
salient in what follows. In each of the next three Parts, I discuss how
each of the three principles from quantum physics has an analogue in
behavioral economics. Each time, I provide a set of three examples of
the principle applied to concrete questions. Each time, I draw two lessons from each principle. Part VI concludes.
Before I proceed, I must sound a note of caution. I am not a physicist, and I make no claim that I will characterize quantum physics
with great accuracy. My goal is not to expound upon physics, but upon
law and economics. For this purpose, only the rudiments of the principles I borrow from quantum mechanics are sufficient.
II. THREE PRINCIPLES FROM QUANTUM MECHANICS
We are familiar from grade school with some of the basic concepts
of physics. We learned about force, mass, and acceleration, the distinc-
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tion between energy and matter, how certain types of energy such as
light and sound travel in waves, and how matter is made up of discrete particles known as atoms. These are among the fundamental
principles of what might be called classical, or Newtonian, mechanics.
Although Newtonian mechanics has been very successful at describing the interactions of most of the physical systems that we can
see in the world, it breaks down when we look at the tiniest constituent pieces of our universe: subatomic particles.
Once we no longer look at matter in the aggregate, but focus on its
smallest individual components, the world starts to look quite a bit
different from what the classical model would predict. Matter behaves
like energy, and energy behaves like matter. Particles behave like
waves, and waves behave like particles. (Or perhaps more accurately,
particles are waves. 11) Two things can be in the same place at the
same time and the same thing can be in two different places at the
same time. (Or perhaps more accurately, nothing is anywhere until
you look at it and then it’s somewhere. 12)
One of the great triumphs of modern science has been the development of a theory of quantum physics, a model of the physical world
capable of explaining and predicting the behavior of energy and matter at the subatomic scale. 13 The term “quantum” refers to a very
small but discrete quantity of something. 14 As I will explain, this con-

See
Wikipedia,
Wave–Particle
Duality,
available
at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wave–particle_duality.
12
See
Wikipedia,
Wave
Function
Collapse,
available
at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wave_function_collapse.
13 To quote Wikipedia (no source more esoteric need be consulted for this discussion): “Quantum mechanics (QM; also known as quantum physics, or
quantum theory) is a fundamental branch of physics which deals with physical phenomena at nanoscopic scales, where the action is on the order of the
Planck constant. The name derives from the observation that some physical
quantities can change only in discrete amounts (Latin quanta), and not in a
continuous (cf. analog) way. It departs from classical mechanics primarily at
the quantum realm of atomic and subatomic length scales. Quantum mechanics provides a mathematical description of much of the dual particle-like and
wave-like behavior and interactions of energy and matter. Quantum mechanics provides a substantially useful framework for many features of the modern periodic table of elements, including the behavior of atoms during chemical bonding, and has played a significant role in the development of many
modern technologies.” Wikipedia, Quantum Mechanics, available at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_mechanics.
14 See id.
11
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cept is central to the underlying theory in quantum physics and offers
insights into behavioral law and economics as well.
Quantum physics is a well-developed and immensely complex set
of theories grounded in decades of experimental observations. I have
no hope of summarizing, let alone expounding upon, the field. Rather,
my object in this section is simply to identify three basic concepts that
have been crucial to the development of quantum physics. I will refer
to them as the Uncertainty Principle, the Correspondence Principle,
and the Quantum Principle. Each of these three concepts distinguishes quantum mechanics from Newtonian mechanics in a different
way. The concepts are non-technical, and I will argue that the intuitions for these concepts translate neatly to the context of law and economics.
A. Uncertainty
Perhaps the best-known term in quantum mechanics is the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. So well-known is this principle, in fact,
that a number of law review articles have already noted analogies to it
in the field of legal studies! 15 But its relevance extends beyond analogies with “uncertainty” in the law. It also draws a parallel to the limits
of what observation through experimentation (in economics) can reveal.

This has mainly been in the context of constitutional theory, although
scholars have drawn very different lessons from the same analogy. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can
Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989) (arguing that just as
observing a particle changes its momentum, rendering a legal judgment on
the social structure changes the social structure); Roberto L. Corrada, Justifying a Search for a Unifying Theory of Unconstitutional Conditions, 72 DENVER U. L. REV. 1011 (1995) (arguing that constitutional theories must allow
for and account for fundamental uncertainty about observed outcomes); Elise
Carter, Comment, The Particulate Constitution: Uncertainty and New
Originalism, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1051 (analogizing Constitution to a particle
for which the current position and trajectory cannot be perfectly fixed). The
indeterminacy implied by uncertainty principles also draws analogies to the
jurisprudential indeterminacies identified by legal realists and scholars in
the Critical Legal Studies movement. See R. George Wright, Should the Law
Reflect the World?: Lessons for Legal Theory from Quantum Mechanics, 18
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 855 (1991); Elise Porter, Note, The Player and the Dice:
Physics and Critical Legal Theory, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 1571 (1991).
15
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The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is related to the “observer
effect,” and it is the observer effect that is crucial here. The observer
effect describes the fact that the mere act of observing the particle affects the particle’s behavior. To identify a particle’s location, you must
observe it. But to observe it, you must observe it with something. (Visual observation, for example, requires photons.) Thus, the process of
observing requires the observer to interact with the observed particle.
But by interacting with the particle, we have changed the behavior of
the very thing we have attempted to observe. (For example, the interaction between the photons used by the observer and the observed
particle will change the momentum of the particle.) 16
The basic idea here, then, is that the very act of observing a system changes the behavior of the system.
B. Correspondence
Less well known, but perhaps more important for our purposes, is
the Correspondence Principle. This principle, simply put, states that
quantum theory should generate identical predictions to classical theory when the system being studied is large (relative to the quantum
scale). 17
Consider the phenomenon of “quantum tunneling.” 18 Quantum
physics explicitly rejects the prediction of Newtonian physics that a
particle cannot penetrate a barrier that requires more energy to surmount than the particle possesses. Imagine I bounce a basketball
against a brick wall. In Newtonian mechanics, the basketball bounces
back to me; there is no way that I can impart enough energy to the
basketball that the basketball, or even a tiny part of it, could pass
through the wall. Yet at the quantum scale, particles always have a
probability of passing through such a barrier. In any cluster of partiConsistent with (but not necessarily because of) the observer effect, the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is often described in terms of the impossibility of knowing both the location and momentum of a particle at any given
time.
17
See, e.g., Wikipedia, Correspondence Principle, available at https://en
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Correspondence_principle (“In physics, the correspondence principle states that the behavior of systems described by the theory of
quantum mechanics (or by the old quantum theory) reproduces classical
physics in the limit of large quantum numbers.”).
18 For excellent illustrations of quantum tunneling and real-world applications of the phenomenon, see Wikipedia, Quantum Tunnelling, available at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_tunnelling.
16
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cles, some fraction of them will pass through a barrier that Newtonian
physics would deem impenetrable. It is as if, when I throw a basketball against a brick wall, a slightly smaller basketball bounces back to
me, and a very tiny basketball appears on the far side of the wall and
keeps on bouncing away from me. 19
But of course this is not what happens when we throw actual basketballs against actual walls. This is not a refutation of quantum
physics. It is merely an affirmation of the fact that the aggregation of
countless quantum interactions in the physical world we observe at
the human scale results in phenomena that are almost perfectly described by Newtonian physics.
To put it more starkly: the Correspondence Principle means that
Newtonian mechanics is fundamentally wrong—its assumptions about
the nature of matter and energy simply do not describe the actual
makeup of matter and energy—but Newtonian mechanics nonetheless
is a remarkably useful approximation of the quantum mechanical reality when we are talking about the everyday world.
Now, this is not to say that quantum mechanics is irrelevant to
everyday life. Quite the contrary. Virtually every reader of this Article
relies on quantum physics throughout the day. The solid-state
memory on which our mobile devices depend—so-called “flash”
memory—relies on quantum tunneling to work. 20
The point here is twofold: On the one hand, quantum mechanics
has shown us that many of the premises and predictions of classical
mechanics are wrong. But on the other hand, while individual particles may engage in behaviors that defy classical theory, it is also the
case that when we aggregate those individual particles up to the scale
of human society, classical physics still gets the job done most of the
time—just not all of the time. I don’t need to know quantum theory to
build a bridge, or sharpen a pencil. On the other hand, I do need quantum theory to build a smart phone.

This phenomenon can be understood as an application of Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. Since one can never know with certainty both the location
and the momentum of a particle, then if we are sure that the particle does not
have enough momentum to penetrate the barrier, then we cannot be sure
that the particle is not already on the other side of the barrier. And if we are
sure that the particle is not already through the barrier, then we cannot be
sure that it lacks sufficient energy to penetrate it. Wild, huh?
20
See
Wikipedia,
Flash
Memory,
available
at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_memory.
19
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C. Quanta
Third and finally, we have the Quantum Principle. In our ordinary
experience, we perceive things like time, space, and energy as flowing
smoothly and continuously. Actions and effort, we might also think,
can be calibrated smoothly and continuously, like moving a slider or
turning a dial, rather than only discretely and discontinuously, like
toggling an on/off switch. I can move a little bit faster; I can walk a
little bit slower.
But at the subatomic scale, there is a sense in which objects and
actions are discrete, not continuous. Mass and energy exist in discrete
packets, and in some conditions, a particle’s energy can only increase
in certain intervals. An atom can have one electron or two electrons,
but it is impossible to have one-and-a-half electrons. Further, an electron in an atom can only have certain amounts of energy. Intermediate energy levels are simply not possible. (Hence, an electron that
changes energy levels makes a “quantum leap”—the smallest possible
change in energy states.)
It is as if on some surfaces, you can walk or run, but it is impossible to jog. This is a Quantum Principle: the principle that certain
physical phenomena occur only in discrete quantities or packets,
called quanta.
III. NEOCLASSICAL AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
In this Part, I briefly introduce neoclassical and behavioral economics before tying them in with the uncertainty, correspondence, and
quantum principles.
A. Neoclassical Economics
The methodology of most of the work that’s been done in law and
economics over the last half-century is neoclassical economics. There
is a vast amount that could be said about this field, but I will briefly
highlight only two of its most salient concepts, both of which are central to understanding the critique of neoclassical economics by behavioral economists.
1. The Law of Demand.
The single most powerful tool in the economist’s toolkit, and the
most general and robust of all theoretical predictions in economics, is
the Law of Demand. The Law of Demand states that people will con-
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sume more of something when its price is lower and less of something
when its price is higher. Importantly, “price” is not limited solely to
the money cost of something, but also the amount of time or energy it
takes to realize a goal, or the lost opportunity that one forgoes when
choosing to do one thing, rather than another. 21 This notion that human behavior responds to prices in this way allows economists both to
understand behavior and to generate useful and consistent predictions
about behavior in countless fields of human activity. Application of the
Law of Demand to generate models of human behavior is often called
“price theory.” 22 Perhaps the most famous price theorist was Gary
Becker, for whom the Law of Demand was a unifying principle permitting insight into not just markets, but a wide range of social, legal,
and political institutions, including crime, discrimination, fertility,
marriage, education, and addiction. 23
Importantly, the Law of Demand is a unifying principle that relates much of the theoretical and empirical work in neoclassical economics. Theoretical work uses the principles of the Law of Demand to
develop formal (usually mathematical) models of human behavior that
generate predictions about how behavior responds to different incentives. These predictions can then be used to specify empirically testable hypotheses, which subsequent empirical work can then support or
refute. To the extent that empirical findings tend to support a model,
economists can rely on that model to make predictions of how people
and markets will respond to incentives in contexts that have not yet
been tested, such as in response to a novel law or policy.
2. Homo economicus.
Perhaps the most central, and certainly the most often criticized,
characteristic of the neoclassical approach is the assumption that actors behave “rationally.” In formal, mathematical models of behavior,
rationality often takes the form of the assumption that actors in the
model can calculate with infinitesimal precision, and at zero cost, the
In other words, “price” is equivalent to “opportunity cost” in this context.
The other main category of neoclassical microeconomic theory is “game
theory,” which relies on similar assumptions about human decisionmaking
but explores rational, optimizing behavior in strategic settings, rather than
in contexts of supply and demand.
23 See generally, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 160 (1968); Gary S. Becker,
THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); Gary S. Becker, A Theory
of Marriage: Part I, 81 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 279 (1973).
21
22
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course of action that is optimal given their preferences. 24 The actor
such models describe is often called, disparagingly, homo economicus,
in contradistinction from actual human beings: homo sapiens. 25
The rationality of homo economicus is unrealistic, clearly. Indeed,
for more than forty years, research in behavioral economics and behavioral psychology has piled up evidence that human beings simply
do not behave “rationally” in this sense. But it is important to understand that this conception of rationality has always been something of
a straw man.
As the leading figure in behavioral economics, Daniel Kanheman,
long ago acknowledged, “No one ever seriously believed that all people
have rational beliefs and make rational decisions all the time. The assumption of rationality is generally understood to be an approximation, which is made in the belief (or hope) that departures from rationality are rare when stakes are significant, or that they will disappear under the discipline of the market.” 26 In other words, adherents
to the neoclassical tradition have no illusions that homo economicus
resembles any human being; rather, they see neoclassical theory as an
analytically parsimonious and policy-relevant approximation of realworld behavior. 27 Neoclassical theory makes this assumption for the

Note that this conception of rationality takes as given the individual’s preferences, and only asks whether the individual’s behavior is consistently and
optimally directed towards those ends. This is same conception of “rationality” that behavioral economics uses. Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEORGETOWN L. J. 67, 80 (2002) (“Within behavioral [economics], . . . the rationality concept is one of procedural rationality, or a set of norms for how judgments and choices should be made as opposed to a set of norms about what ends should be sought.”).
25 See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own
Utility Function, Would He Want One with a Conscience?, 77 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 593 (1987).
26 Daniel Kahneman, A Psychological Perspective on Economics, 93 AMERICAN
ECONOMIC REVIEW 162, 162 (May 2003). “[B]ehavioral law and economics
stresses that conventional law and economics utilizes an empirically false
model of behavior—a point already acknowledged within law and economics
and championed years ago in regard to positive economics by Milton Friedman, one of the primary methodological influences on law and economics.”
Mitchell, supra note 24, at 74 (citing Milton Friedman, The Methodology of
Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3–43 (1953)).
27 Mitchell, supra note 24, at 69 (“Proponents of law and economics
acknowledge this descriptive inaccuracy but retain the assumption [of perfect
24
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convenience of mathematical modeling. It simplifies the math and
serves as a rough approximation of a much milder, and more plausible, conception of rationality: a “rational” actor is merely someone who
directs her energies toward those things that make her better off and
away from those things that make her worse off, rather than the other
way around. 28
Nonetheless, there always remains the danger that the use of the
stronger version of rationality for the sake of simplifying the math
makes the resulting models bad at predicting actual human behavior.
After all, people may depart from the assumptions of rationality in
systematic ways, such that even the milder conception of rationality is
not adequate, not even as an approximation. And indeed, much of
scholarship in behavioral economics provides evidence of exactly this
problem—that, at least when one looks at individual decisionmaking,
the predictions of neoclassical theory are simply wrong. I turn to this
literature now.
B. Behavioral Economics
The inauthenticity of the rationality assumption in neoclassical
economics has long bothered many economists (and non-economists!),
and leading economists have long challenged the need for rationality
as a simplifying assumption. 29 The movement to challenge the rationality assumptions of neoclassical economics took shape beginning in
the 1970s with seminal work by, among others, Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky, who documented preferences inconsistent with neoclassical assumptions about rationality, such as “loss aversion,” 30 and

rationality] for lack of a better alternative for prediction and policy analysis.”).
28 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at
Behavior, 101 J. POLITICAL ECONOMY 385, 386 (1993) (emphasis in original)
(“The analysis assumes that individuals maximize welfare as they conceive it,
whether they be selfish altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic.”).
29 Classic papers calling for economists to incorporate a more nuanced model
of human cognition and behavior into economic theory include Albert O.
Hirshman, Against Parsimony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse, 74 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 89 (May 1984),
and Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 317 (1977).
30 See generally Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decisions under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 313 (Mar. 1979).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2926548

2017]

Quantum Economics and Law

15

systematic biases in individual decisionmaking, such as the “framing
effect.” 31
Another well-documented behavioral bias is the “anchoring effect.”
The anchoring effect has been demonstrated in experiments in which
subjects are asked to estimate some numerical quantity after being
exposed to an irrelevant number. The irrelevant number serves as an
“anchor” drawing the estimates closer to the anchor even though the
number is totally uninformative. To make this concrete: Asking people
to recite the last two digits of their social security number will affect
how much people are willing to pay for a cordless computer keyboard,
or a box of Belgian chocolates. 32 Such obvious biases in decisionmaking are essentially impossible to square with a model of “rational” decisionmaking.
But no finding in behavioral economics has had a greater impact
on law and economics than the “endowment effect,” and if behavioral
economics has a mascot, it is without question a souvenir coffee mug
emblazoned with the logo of Cornell University. In a famous set of experiments, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler examined whether subjects (undergraduate students at Cornell) who were randomly assigned a coffee mug valued the coffee mug higher than (otherwise
identical) students who were not randomly assigned a mug. 33 What
they found was a dramatic difference: students endowed with the
mugs valued them twice as much as those not endowed. 34 In a series
of related experiments, they ruled out other potential causes of the
observed difference, such as difficulty understanding or following instructions, 35 strategic misrepresentation of values, 36 income effects, 37
See generally, e.g., Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice
and the Framing of Decisions, 59 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS S251 (Oct. 1986).
32 See, e.g., Dan Ariely, George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec, “Coherent
Arbitrariness”: Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences, 118 QUARTERLY J. ECONOMICS 73, 76 (2003) (finding “the impact of the social security
number on stated [willingness to pay] was significant in every product category”).
33 Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Experimental
Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1325 (Dec. 1990).
34 Id. at 1332.
35 Id. at 1329–1336.
36 Id. at 1336–1338.
37 Id. at 1338–1342. An “income effect” is a change in a person’s valuation of
an object due to a change in a person’s wealth. Intuitively, a wealthier person
may have greater willingness to pay more for something because she has
greater ability to pay. Income effects are predicted by standard neoclassical
31
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or perception of the mug as a “prize.” 38 These experiments have been
replicated countless times in many different contexts. 39 This is the endowment effect: endow a person with something, and the mere fact of
possession make it more valuable to him than when he did not possess
it.
Results such as these have undermined the assumptions of neoclassical economics, and behavioral economics has been immensely
influential in the legal academy, in public discourse, and in policy. 40
Indeed, behavioral law and economics, and in particular “soft paternalism” 41 or “libertarian paternalism,” 42 which emphasizes behavioral
“nudges” that preserve individual choice while constructing a “choice
architecture” that favors welfare-enhancing decisions, has become
probably the dominant policy agenda in both the academy and in
many government circles today.
Now, what I have offered so far is a series of individual findings in
behavioral economics, not the big picture for the field. What exactly is
“behavioral economics”? Is it nothing more than a collection of empirical results? (Maybe; I will return to this concern shortly.) Here, I will
simply highlight a few points of comparison with neoclassical economics. 43 Behavioral economics and neoclassical economics both study
human behavior, and they both examine the role of incentives in human interactions. But there are at least three main points of divergence.
First, behavioral economics takes as its starting point a fundamentally empirical rather than theoretical approach. Drawing on the
theory, and thus a test for the endowment effect would need to rule out income effects as an explanation.
38 Id. at 1342.
39 For a review of the literature on the endowment effect, see Charles R. Plott
and Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?, 97 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1449, 1452–1454 (Sept. 2007).
40 See Ryan Bubb and Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims
Its Sails and Why, 127 HARVARD L. REV. 1593, 1595 (2014) (“Regulatory policies in the United States are already being informed by BLE [behavioral law
and economics].”).
41 Id. at 1604.
42 Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (2003).
43 The field of behavioral economics is too vast to summarize here and I make
no attempt. See generally Stephano DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics:
Evidence from the Field, 47 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 315 (June
2009).
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methodologies and insights of psychology and other fields, behavioral
economists have conducted a wide range of experimental studies, usually laboratory experiments, testing whether subject’s behavior conforms to the predictions of neoclassical economics.
Second, while neoclassical economics attempts to identify equilibria in markets, firms, and other institutions, most experimental work
in behavioral economics focuses on the decisionmaking behavior of individuals.
Third, and most obviously, these experimental studies of individual behavior do not assume rationality! I’ve already given several examples of research reporting deviations from what one might expect a
purely rational actor to do. There are countless others; I’ll describe two
more (the contrast effect and the certainty effect) later.
Of course, these various effects are not predicted by standard, rational-actor models of neoclassical economics. And so now we see the
sense in which behavioral economics is quantum economics. Just as
Newtonian mechanics breaks down when we look at the constituent
pieces of our universe, neoclassical economics breaks down when we
look at the constituent pieces of our society: individual people. And
just as quantum mechanics challenged the nano-foundations for Newtonian mechanics, behavioral economics challenges the nanofoundations for neoclassical economics.
And that’s not the end of the analogy. In my view, some of the
same principles that motivate and organize quantum mechanics can
help us understand quantum economics as well.
IV. AN UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE
FOR BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
Laboratory experiments, by their very design, create an artificial
environment. This artificiality is desirable, because the whole point of
the laboratory experiment is to isolate a particular aspect of human
behavior so as to study it while holding all else constant. But precisely
because lab experiments examine human behavior in an artificial setting, we should be alert to the possibility that the very act of observing
subjects will lead them to change their behavior. There are many potential reasons for this: subjects may attempt to conform their behavior to the experimenter’s expectations; subjects may feel self-conscious,
knowing they are being observed; and so on.
This phenomenon is well understood in behavioral social science,
and goes by various names in the literature in behavioral economics:

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2926548

18

William H.J. Hubbard

[2017

observer effect, 44 Hawthorne effect, 45 or demand effect. 46 In the spirit
of the analogy to quantum physics, I will refer to this as the Uncertainty Principle for quantum economics. Although this principle is often acknowledged, its implications for the relationship between behavioral and neoclassical economics, and for the future of law and economics, are not as well recognized. In this part, I provide examples of
important experiments that reveal the profound effect of the Uncertainty Principle in experimental research and then draw out two key
lessons for behavioral law and economics.
A. Three Examples
1. The endowment effect, revisited.
As noted above, a large and impressive literature has reported
countless studies documenting the endowment effect in carefully designed experiments. 47 But rigorously demonstrating the endowment
effect is no small feat; the mere fact that individuals would need to be
paid more to sell an item (“willingness to accept” or WTA) than they
would be prepared to pay to buy the item (“willingness to pay” or
WTP) does not prove the presence of an endowment effect. 48 There are
countless other potential explanations that, unless ruled out, would

See, e.g., Timothy N. Cason and Charles R. Plott, Misconceptions and
Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and
Framing, 122 J. POLITICAL ECONOMY 1235, 1241 (2014) (defining the “classical observer effect” as “what is to be measured is influenced by the attempt to
measure it”).
45 See Steven D. Levitt and John A. List, Was There Really a Hawthorne Effect at the Hawthorne Plant? An Analysis of the Original Illumination Experiments, 3 AMERICAN ECONOMIC J.: APPLIED ECONOMICS 224, 227–29 (2011)
(describing the various meanings of Hawthorne effect and the setup of the
original experiment).
46 See, e.g., Charles R. Plott and Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay—
Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions,
and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 530, 543 (June 2005). I doubt that I am the first to connect the dots
between uncertainty principles in quantum physics and observer effects in
experimental psychology or economics, although none of the articles connecting quantum physics to law cited above do so. See note 15.
47 See notes 33–39 and accompanying text.
48 Plott and Zeiler, supra note 46, at 531.
44
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confound any effort to attribute a gap between WTP and WTA to the
endowment effect. 49
For example, the fact that the experimenter hands the mug to the
subject may signal to the subject that the mug is valuable; the subject
upgrades her assessment of the mug’s value based on an inference
that the mug is valuable, given that the experimenter made a deliberate decision to give her the mug (rather than something else). 50 Thus,
a subject who is given a mug and asked to sell it will give it a higher
dollar value than a subject not given a mug. This pattern would be
predicted by standard neoclassical theory, based on individual’s rational updating of beliefs about a product’s value based on actions taken by others.
Another closely related possibility is that attitudes about gifts and
other-regarding preferences may make subjects less willing to sell the
mugs given to them. 51 After all, many people would consider it rude or
ungrateful to sell a gift immediately after receiving it—and to do so in
front of the gift-giver! Yet many experiments testing for an endowment effect involve the experimenter handing a mug to a subject with
the words such as “I am giving this mug to you,” which implies a gift.
Then, inquiries about willingness to part with the mug are made in
the presence of the same experimenter. Thus, the reluctance of mugowners to part with their mugs may be a function of social pressures,
rather than a change in the subject’s valuation of the mug due to being endowed with it.
Unlike the signaling story, however, this story about otherregarding preferences is inconsistent with the narrow conception of
self-interested preferences traditionally employed in neoclassical models. Thus, if other-regarding preferences explains the results of the
endowment effect studies, this is still a “behavioral” result—but one
based on a different behavioral phenomenon.
In a series of meticulously constructed experiments, Charles Plott
and Kathryn Zeiler replicated the iconic mug studies, but refined their
experimental design to rule out the effects of signaling, otherregarding preferences, and other possible confounds. 52 To rule out sigId. at 530–532. See also Charles R. Plott and Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange
Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory
and Prospect Theory?, 97 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 1449, 1450 (Sept.
2007).
50 Id. at 1450.
51 Id. at 1450.
52 Plott and Zeiler also account for the possibilities that subjects’ decisions are
affected by observing other subjects’ decisions, that subjects were affected by
49
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naling, they added a statement in the instructions to subjects that the
experimenter chose to give a mug (rather than something else) based
on a coin flip. 53 To rule out the effect of the mug being perceived as a
gift, they removed any references to “giving” or “gift” when distributing the mugs, instead saying to the group of subjects, “These mugs
are yours.” 54 In a series of experiments in which the effects of signaling and other-regarding preferences were eliminated, evidence of an
“endowment effect” disappeared. 55
More generally, Plott and Zeiler show that tweaking instructions
to subjects is enough to make the experimental results for the endowment effect go away. 56 And realistic conditions, such as opportunities
for learning and instruction or experience with a type of transaction,
also eliminate the experimentally observed endowment effect. 57 As
they put it, “Either no ‘endowment effect’ of the sort predicted by prospect theory exists or the effect is sufficiently weak that other phenomena easily swamp it.” 58
2. Social preferences and observer effects.
A frequent finding in the behavioral literature is that people have
social preferences—in other words, a desire to treat other people fairly
in a way that is inconsistent with the assumption of narrow selfinterest that is usually made in neoclassical models. 59 It is, of course,
unquestionable that people indeed have such preferences. But to the
the physical proximity of the mugs at the time their willingness to trade was
elicited, or that trading away their mugs required more effort than retaining
them. Id. at 1450, 1455, 1460–1463. These other potential confounds, however, did not seem to be driving the results. Id. at 1458, 1460–1461.
53 Id. at 1458–1462.
54 Id. at 1459.
55 Id. at 1458, 1463.
56 Id. at 1463.
57 Charles R. Plott and Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay—Willingness
to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
530, 543–44 (June 2005); John A. List, Neoclassical Theory versus Prospect
Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615, 624 (Mar.
2004); John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?,
118 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 41, 70 (Feb. 2003).
58 Plott and Zeiler, 97 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW at 1463.
59 John A. List, The Behavioralist Meets the Market: Measuring Social Preferences and Reputation Effects in Actual Transactions, 114 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1, 3–4, 6–12 (2006).
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extent that such preferences are a challenge to neoclassical theory, it
is because neoclassical theory predicts that buyers and sellers in markets will be driven by private gain, not social preferences, in their
dealing. For example, neoclassical theory might predict that sellers in
a market will care about their reputations among consumers, but only
to the extent that reputation helps them earn profits—not out of any
non-instrumental desire to treat consumers with fairness.
Do the findings of behavioral economics refute this prediction of
neoclassical economics? The answer is not obvious. Laboratory experiments repeatedly find that subjects are willing to incur a cost to treat
others fairly, but does this translate to the market? Or is this an artifact of the fact that the subjects (usually college students) know they
are being closely observed by the experimenter (usually the students’
own professors)?
John List set out to test these question with a series of ingenious
experiments. 60 His study used as subjects not college students but professional memorabilia dealers—people who make a living buying and
selling collectibles such as baseball cards—and conducted laboratory
experiments where they would be offered a payment (say $20) by a
buyer and asked for a baseball card of commensurate value. 61 What he
found in the laboratory setting was that baseball card dealers would
select baseball cards of equal value to the amount of money offered
them by a buyer in the experiment, even when the dealer could have
gotten away with selling a baseball card of lesser value. 62 (This was
possible because many lower-value baseball cards are indistinguishable to the untrained eye from a baseball card in better condition.) This
result confirmed the frequent finding in the experimental literature
that people’s preference for fairness trumps the prediction of neoclassical models that self-interest will lead the dealer to substitute the
similar-but-lower-value card in order to make a greater profit.
List then repeated the experiment not in the laboratory but in the
field. He went to a real-world baseball card convention, and he had
confederates posing as baseball card collectors approach dealers and
offer them money for baseball cards. (Thus, the dealers did not know
they were subjects in an experiment.) These confederates then reId. at 10–13.
Although secondary to his experimental objective, it is worth noting that by
constructing a laboratory experiment where subject undertook activities with
which they were very familiar, List eliminated one of the major concerns with
experimental work, which is that the subjects are confused by an unfamiliar
set of demands placed upon them.
62 Id. at 4, 15–21.
60
61
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turned and had their cards examined by experts in order to see
whether the dealers had given them cards of equal value to the money
offered, or if the dealers had substituted cards of lesser value that
would be indistinguishable to untrained eyes. 63 The effect of social
preferences that was detected in the laboratory was only sometimes
present in the real-world setting: consistent with a neoclassical model
in which only reputation (rather than reciprocity or fairness) constrains sellers, local sellers (i.e., sellers who were more likely to see
the same buyer again) would offer a higher-quality card in response to
a higher dollar offer—but nonlocal dealers (who would never see the
buyer again, and therefore had no repeat-play incentives) did not. 64
3. Altruism and stakes.
Another concern with many results from laboratory experiments,
including experiments on the endowment effect and social preferences,
is that the stakes of the experiments are too low to induce subjects to
behave in the way they would in real-world settings. In a recent article by Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, she examines experimental subjects’ willingness to breach a contract in order to make more money. 65 The experiment tests the neoclassical prediction of “efficient breach,” in
which a party deliberately breaches a contract because it is more profitable to break one’s promise than to comply with one’s contractual
obligations. And it entertains the competing hypothesis that moral
considerations lead people to keep their promises even when neoclassical theory says it is inefficient to keep a promise. 66
Most of the subjects in the experiment did not breach their contracts even when it was in their financial self-interest to do so, at least
when stakes were low. But for a profit of a mere $12, the majority of
subjects would breach the contract, and when the payoff from breaking one’s promise reached $24, over 72% of subjects broke their promises. 67 Most revealing was one of the reasons given by a subject for not
breaching the contract:

Id. at 4, 12–13.
Id. at 4, 22–24.
65 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Incentives for Breach, 17 AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS REVIEW 290, 291 (2015).
66 Id. at 291–93.
67 Id. at 300 (Figure 1).
63
64
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“Betrayal, for the most part, was not worth 4–15 extra dollars.” 68
In other words, while it is surely true that moral considerations lead
people to keep promises that they would otherwise benefit from breaking, what we find is a result that looks less like social or moral preferences, and more like homo economicus and the Law of Demand: people
respond in predictable ways to changes in prices, even the price of a
broken promise. For the experimental subjects, it might not be worth
4 dollars, or even 15 dollars, but 24 dollars to commit betrayal? Sure!
B. Two Lessons
In short, the take-away from studies such as those by Plott and
Zeiler, List, and Wilkinson-Ryan is that showing that a behavioral
phenomenon occurs under (some) laboratory conditions can prove that
a phenomenon exists, but it is something else entirely to show that (1)
the phenomenon is sufficiently big that it will not be swamped by other factors outside the pristine setting of the laboratory, and (2) the
phenomenon persists in real-world settings, where things like experience, learning, and competition may serve to compensate for or correct
behavioral biases.
Does this mean we should disregard results from laboratory experiments? Of course not. Rather, these studies counsel us to be mindful
that observer effects are a serious concern in laboratory settings in the
social sciences, precisely because human subjects are cognizant of the
experimental setting and influenced by the social context in which
they behave. 69 In the jargon of economics, laboratory experiments often have limited external validity, meaning that their results cannot
necessarily be extrapolated to contexts different from the experimental setting in which the results were observed.
To be more precise, the Uncertainty Principle offers two lessons for
behavioral economics. First, it inverts the critique often levied by behavioral economists that neoclassical economics relies upon “unrealistic” assumptions. The same gimlet eye cast upon neoclassical analysis
can be directed toward behavioral analysis; both fields benefit from
greater skepticism. Second, it identifies the directions future empirical
Id. at 307.
For further discussion, see generally, e.g., Steven D. Levitt and John A.
List, What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal
about the Real World?, 21 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 153 (Spring
2007).
68
69
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work in law and economics should take. The “lab” will always be essential for identifying behavioral phenomena, but it is only in the
“field” that policy-relevant empirical regularities can be measured.
1. Lesson: Physician, heal thyself!
The perfect-rationality assumption in many neoclassical models
has long been pilloried as unrealistic, which it surely is. The concern is
that findings based on artificially constructed and deliberately simplified theoretical models may be an unreliable guide for policy in the
real world. Scholars and policymakers who have long been uneasy
with the formality and reductionism of neoclassical theory have enthusiastically embraced this trenchant critique of rational-actor models by behavioral economists.
But what is the basis for the scholarly claims and policy prescriptions made by most behavioral economists? Laboratory experiments.
And the concern here is that empirical results based on artificially
constructed and deliberately simplified empirical models may be an
unreliable guide for policy in the real world.
To be clear: this is not a defense of jumping to policy prescriptions
based on simplistic neoclassical models. Instead, I am arguing for an
equal dose of caution for scholars in law and economics who are
tempted to jump to policy prescriptions based on simplistic behavioral
experiments. Behavioral law and economics, in other words, would
benefit from heeding its own advice.
2. Lesson: Bring law and economics research into the field.
How, then, to make behavioral law and economics (and, for that
matter, neoclassical law and economics) sufficiently robust in its findings to justify policy? The answer is to run experiments outside the
lab, with an eye toward identifying whether behavioral phenomena
manifest themselves as empirical regularities in settings that are directly relevant to the legal or policy question at stake, and where the
artificiality of the lab is reduced. 70 To be sure, this lesson is not lost on
practitioners of behavioral economics. Indeed, the greatest achievements in behavioral economics over the past generation have been the
See Mitchell, supra note 24, at 75 (2002) (noting that for behavioral law
and economics to have predictive power, it must accumulate “reliable data
regarding . . . the resistance of nonrational behavior to incentives and debiasing mechanisms that may be available through legal and economic systems”).

70
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replication in the field (under realistic conditions and high stakes) of
numerous seminal results from the laboratory. 71
Experimental work in the laboratory, too, must continue. It has
important advantages that make it a necessary part of any serious research agenda on behavior. Lab experiments and field studies simply
have different strengths. 72 Field studies, precisely because they involve more realistic conditions, are superior for predicting the direction and magnitudes of potential policy changes. 73 Thus, a legal intervention intended to correct for a behavioral bias should (ideally) be
supported by evidence from field studies indicating that the intervention will have the desired effect.
It is hard to imagine lab experiments having equivalent value for
this task. Yet without laboratory experiments, how does one identify
whether a bias exists in the first place, given the presence of many
confounding factors in real-world settings? 74 The laboratory is the only
setting where the researcher can control nearly all of the potentially
confounding factors. It is no accident, therefore, that the seminal studies supporting prospect theory and identifying behavioral biases have
been lab experiments.
The next Part provides examples of how laboratory experiments,
field experiments, and observational (i.e., non-experimental) data from
the field have yielded refinements to our understanding of the endowment effect and other behavioral phenomena in policy-relevant
contexts.

See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman, A Psychological Perspective on Economics, 93
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 162, 162 (May 2003) (“The clearest progress
has occurred in correcting and elaborating the assumption of selfishness . . . .
Experiments conducted in low-income countries by investigators armed with
dollars confirmed conclusively that quite a few people will forgo a substantial
sum for the sole benefit of denying a larger sum to an anonymous stranger
who has treated them ungenerously.”).
72 Plott and Zeiler provide a succinct version of the argument. Charles R.
Plott and Kathryn Zeiler, Exchange Asymmetries Incorrectly Interpreted as
Evidence of Endowment Effect Theory and Prospect Theory?, 97 AMERICAN
ECONOMIC REVIEW 1449, 1450–1451 & n.3 (Sept. 2007).
73 Plott and Zeiler refer to this as “parameter estimation” as opposed to “theory testing.” Id. at 1450 n.3.
74 Plott and Zeiler refer to this as “theory testing” as opposed to “parameter
estimation.” Id. at 1450 n.3.
71
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V. A CORRESPONDENCE PRINCIPLE FOR
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
In the realm of physics, the Correspondence Principle tells us that
Newtonian mechanics is basically wrong, but it’s a pretty good approximation at the scale of human society, most but not all of the time. The
analogous principle in behavioral economics is that neoclassical economics is basically wrong, but it’s a pretty good approximation at the
scale of human society, most but not all of the time.
This presents a crucial question for behavioral law and economics:
What happens when you aggregate from the level of individuals up to
the level of firms, markets, and other social institutions? Cognitive
biases that affect individuals might remain significant at the aggregate level, but they might not. Tom Ulen has made this exact point
(albeit without further elaboration):
As a theory of human decision-making, rational choice theory
may be analogous to classical Newtonian mechanics: it describes and predicts much of routine human decision-making.
For instance, all the consumers in a particular market—e.g., all
the consumers of bicycles—when taken together, behave in the
fashion that the theory predicts, even if some of them behave
irrationally. 75
Consider the following: in a marketplace, businesses who behave
rationally will do better than businesses who do not. Six decades ago,
Gary Becker made precisely this argument. If market participants
make decisions based on biases, they will not be able to make as much
money as market participants who methodically and rationally calculate the profit-maximizing course of action. 76
Does this mean that markets will eliminate all cognitive biases?
No. Helpful here is another study by John List. In this study, List reruns a version of the iconic “mug” experiments to test for the endowment effect among individuals at a collectibles convention, thereby
studying the endowment effect among a group of subjects with varying
experience in both holding onto, and trading away, collectibles such as
baseball cards. 77 The subjects were a mix of consumers who were
Ulen, supra note 10, 462. See also Porter, supra note 15, at 1593 (1991) (referring to the principle of “scale,” which is equivalent to what I describe as
“correspondence”).
76 Gary S. Becker, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 16 (2d ed. 1971).
77 John A. List, Neoclassical Theory versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the
Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615, 617 (Mar. 2004).
75
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merely attending the trade show and professional dealers who tended
booths where they bought and sold collectibles. 78 What List found was
striking: consumers with relatively little trading experience in collectibles exhibited a strong endowment effect, which consumers with “intense” trading experience, as well as professional dealers, had no endowment effect at all—their behavior was perfectly predicted by neoclassical theory. 79 And that’s the rub: the endowment effect does matter in real-world, market settings—but only in some circumstances.
Relying solely on “neoclassical” results will lead academics and policymakers astray; but so will reliance solely on “behavioral” results.
In this Part, I describe three examples of important research that
shows the limit of quantum economics when applied at the “Newtonian scale,” i.e., longer time periods and interacting groups of individuals, rather than test subjects acting in isolation. What we find is that
sometimes, quantum effects disappear at the Newtonian scale—but
sometimes they do not. And because law operates at varying scales,
regulating individuals, markets, institutions, and so on, sometimes
behavioral effects will dominate, and sometimes neoclassical effects
will dominate. In other words, just as one doesn’t need quantum mechanics to build a bridge, but does to build a smart phone, the challenge for law and economics is determining when behavioral findings
remain important at policy-relevant scales. The three examples below
lead us to two lessons for addressing this challenge.
A. Three Examples
1. Quantum economics at Newtonian time scales.
In additional to the shift from isolated individuals to aggregates of
individuals in market settings, another sense in which “scale” matters
is temporal scale. Imagine workers engaged in collective bargaining
with an employer over the structure of their wage contract, in a setting where each worker individually produces output (i.e., a “piece
rate” contract). An example of this is tea-plucking, where workers on a

Id. at 617–618.
Id. at 621–622. List finds the same pattern in an earlier field experiment in
which he endows subjects with different memorabilia, such as baseball cards
or collectible pins. John A. List, Does Market Experience Eliminate Market
Anomalies?, 118 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 41, 70–71 (Feb. 2003).
78
79
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tea plantation collect tea leaves and are paid a baseline wage plus a
piece rate per kilogram of tea leave collected. 80
Standard price theory would predict that a wage structure with a
lower base wage but a higher piece rate would lead to higher productivity than a wage structure that pays a higher base wage but a lower
piece rate. This is because workers receive the baseline wage regardless of effort, but the piece rate only with effort. A relatively high piece
rate, therefore, incentivizes high effort.
One can easily anticipate the “behavioral” rejoinder: a higher base
wage and lower piece rate signals trust in the worker, reduces stress
and anxiety, and triggers norms of reciprocity that could increase
productivity, contrary to the neoclassical prediction. Thus, the behavioral prediction based on social and moral preferences for trust and
reciprocity, would be that a higher base rate and lower piece rate
would lead to higher productivity.
A recent paper by Jayaraman, Ray, and de Véricourt tested exactly
these hypotheses in a real-world setting. Workers on a tea plantation
in India experienced a switch from a high piece rate (with a low base
wage) to a high wage (with a low base rate). 81 What they found was
that in the first month following the change, there was an enormous
surge in productivity—maybe a 40% increase relative to a comparison
plantation without the change. 82 This was clearly inconsistent with
neoclassical theory and consistent with a behavioral explanation.
But the increased productivity did not last. Three months later,
the productivity of workers had regressed to the level predicted by
price theory. Concepts such as trust or reciprocity had no explanatory
power. 83
So which is right: quantum or Newtonian economics? The answer
is, roughly, “both”; but scale matters—in this case, the time scale.
Price effects cannot explain the observed effects of the change in the
first month of the new contract. The emotional or psychological effect
of a higher base wage mattered, at least in the short term. But over
time, the cold, relentless logic of the Law of Demand sufficed to explain the behavior of the workers.
Does this mean that behavioral economics is irrelevant in longer
time scales? Certainly not! Indeed, an important finding of behavioral
economics is that people’s perceptions and preferences adapt over time
See Rajshri Jayaraman, Debraj Ray, and Francis de Véricourt, Anatomy of
a Contract Change, 106 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 316, 316 (Feb. 2016).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 323–325.
83 Id. at 339–340.
80
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to a new status quo. 84 More to the point, though, is that the application of behavioral versus neoclassical methods depends on the policyrelevant question: do we care about the effect of the wage-contract intervention in the short term (about one month) or the long term (four
months or more)? If it is the latter, the simplest and most reliable
model for predicting the impact of the policy is neoclassical.
Field experiments in the United States have yielded similar results, albeit over much shorter time scales. Uri Gneezy and John List
recruited subjects for (real) work doing data entry or door-to-door
fundraising for six hours. 85 Although the jobs were advertised as paying $12/hour (data entry) or $10/hour (fundraising), participants in the
“gift” treatment group were told they would be paid $20/hour (and in
fact they were). 86 Just as in the tea plantation study, if reciprocity is
an important determinant of behavior, one might predict that workers
receiving the “gift” treatment would be more productive.
And so they were—up to a point. Over the first three hours, the
gift-wage group was significantly more productive than the regularwage group. But by the second half of the working period, the productivity of the gift-wage group was indistinguishable from the productivity of the regular-wage group. 87 Further, from the employer’s perspective the experiment “backfired”: the increase in productivity was far
less than the increase in wages paid. More work would have been
completed, at lower total cost, if more people were hired, all at $10 or
$12 per hour. 88
In these studies, the reversion from a “behavioral” response to a
“neoclassical” response itself might have been predicted based on results from behavioral economics: the authors note different “psychological processes in the short run and in the long run . . . hot versus
cold decision making.” 89 But if you are a business trying to make monFor a discussion of literature in this area and an application to law, see
generally Jonathan Masur, John Bronsteen, and Christopher Buccafusco,
Happiness and Punishment, 76 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 1037
(2009).
85 Uri Gneezy and John A. List, Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments, 74 ECONOMETRICA 1365, 1367 (Sept. 2006).
86 Id. at 1367–1370. The treatment and control groups in each experiment
were isolated from each other, to avoid the subjects knowing the existence of
another group being paid a different wage. Id.
87 Id. at 1370–1379.
88 Id. at 1378.
89 Id. at 1366.
84
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ey in data entry or fundraising which hypothesis—the behavioral or
the neoclassical—will help you make money? This is the Correspondence Principle in action: quantum economics is “right” and Newtonian
economics is “wrong,” but at larger scales, Newtonian economics will
often be the better tool for analysis.
2. Intermediaries and the endowment effect.
Another way that real-world, market settings can differ from experiments involving isolated subjects is that in the real world, biased
individuals have the benefit of others who might be in a position to
improve their decisionmaking. “Two heads are better than one,” as the
old saying goes, and perhaps two heads are more “rational” than one,
as well. More precisely, in market settings, we often make transactions, especially major transactions such as buying a home or starting
a business, with the aid of experienced intermediaries, such as lawyers.
A recent paper by Jennifer Arlen and Stephan Tontrup explores
the role of intermediaries on the endowment effect. 90 The study is a
laboratory experiment, very much in the spirit of countless other laboratory experiments on the endowment effect. The subjects of this
experiment were each given a lottery ticket. The lottery ticket had a
payoff that depended on the flip of a coin. Some tickets would win if
the coin came up heads, and others won if the coin came up tails. A
winning ticket would give the students eight euros, while a losing
ticket would pay nothing. 91
After each subject was given a ticket and they had a chance to see
whether the ticket would win with heads or win with tails, each subject had the chance to trade their tickets for a ticket of the opposite
type. A ticket that won with heads could be exchanged for a ticket that
won with tails, and vice versa. If a subject made such a trade, she
would get paid a 25 euro-cents bonus regardless of whether or not the
ticket won. 92
Given that heads and tails have exactly equal probabilities of winning, conventional neoclassical theory predicts that most or all subjects will trade their tickets: after all, making an exchange is like getting 25 cents for free. But the behavioral prediction would be that
Jennifer Arlen and Stephan Tontrup, Does the Endowment Effect Justify
Legal Intervention? The Debiasing Effect of Institutions, 44 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 143, 144–45 (2015).
91 Id. at 148. Eight euros was worth about $11 at the time.
92 Id.
90
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most subjects would not exchange their tickets, because of the endowment effect.
What Arlen and Tontrup found was a dramatic confirmation of the
endowment effect: over 70% of the subjects did not trade. In other
words, over 70% of subjects forgo the opportunity for free money after
being endowed with a lottery ticket. 93
Then they ran a second experiment. This one had a twist. It used
the same set of lottery tickets, and the bonus for trading one’s ticket
remained the same as well. But this time, the decision whether or not
to exchange the ticket would not be made by the subject herself but
instead by her agent. Each subject had an agent, designated by the
experimenter, who was simply another student participating in the
experiment. The agent would not share in any of the payments to the
subject but instead would get paid separately. The agent’s payment
was based on an incentive scheme chosen by the subjects: each subject
would choose whether the agent would receive the incentive payment
only if the agent traded the ticket, or only if the agent did not trade
the ticket. 94
Now, given that in the first experiment over 70% of the subjects refused to exchange their tickets, one would expect that 70% of the subjects would give their agents an incentive not to trade. But Arlen and
Tontrup found the opposite: over 75% of the subjects gave their agent
an incentive to trade. 95 It is as if the mere act of shifting responsibility
for the final decision from the subject to the agent led the subjects in
this experiment to behave in ways much more consistent with neoclassical theory then those same subjects would have behaved if they
had to make the decisions themselves.
Thus, we see that the endowment effect can be largely eliminated
by the introduction of an agent who makes the decision on behalf of
the subject. Importantly, this is so even though the agent’s instructions for what to do (i.e., the incentive scheme) were given by the subject herself. This experiment adds a little realism to the literature on
the endowment effect—after all, for many of the major transactions we
undertake in our lives, we retain agents—and in so doing it reveals
the fragility the behavioral prediction of an endowment effect. 96 InId. at 154.
Id. at 151–152.
95 Id. at 154.
96 See also Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, and Samuel Issacharoff, Creating Convergence: Debiasing Biased Litigants, 22 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
913, 922 (1997), who note that lawyers can debias litigants to achieve mutually beneficial bargains.
93
94
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crease the “scale” of the transaction from one person to two, and the
effect nearly disappears.
3. Judges and the contrast effect.
So far, I have described examples where behavioral effects disappear in the context of real-world institutions (transaction intermediaries) or long time scales (hours or months). But behavioral effects don’t
always go away at the scale of real-life institutions over long time periods. A recent paper makes this point in a setting where the stakes
could not be higher: real-world criminal sentencing.
Many studies in the laboratory setting have found behavioral biases at work in decisionmaking intended to mimic judicial decisionmaking 97 or jury decisionmaking. 98 If these studies have external validity,
the stakes for real-world judging are enormous. Do we observe behavioral biases in real-world judicial decisionmaking? Can we demonstrate this in an empirically rigorous way?
In Relative Judgments, Adi Leibovitch notes a puzzle about the
criminal sentencing of juvenile offenders. In study after study, researchers have found that minors who are sentenced in the juvenile
justice system receive harsher sentences than minors who are sentenced in the regular criminal courts for the identical crime. 99 How
could it be that an alternate system especially created to provide
greater leniency towards minors would have the opposite effect?
Leibovitch hypothesizes that behavioral economics has the answer:
this strange result is due to the “contrast effect.” 100
In the context of criminal sentencing, the contrast effect will lead a
judge to exaggerate the lenity or severity of a sentence in a given case
based on comparisons with other cases. A judge who has heard many
petty cases will perceive a moderately severe case as relatively grave,
Holger Spamann and Lars Klöhn, Justice Is Less Blind, and Less Legalistic, than We Thought: Evidence from an Experiment with Real Judges, 45
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 255, 276 (2016) (finding in an experimental setting that real-world judges will interpret identical legal rules in opposite
ways based on legally irrelevant personal characteristics of litigants).
98 Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman, and Matthew L. Spitzer,
Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspective on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81
VA. L. REV. 1341, 1403 (1995) (finding strong framing effects of jury instructions on non-pecuniary damage awards).
99 Adi Leibovitch, Relative Judgments, 45 JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 281,
319 (2016).
100 Id. at 288–89.
97
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and impose a high sentence. A judge who has heard many cases involving heinous crimes will perceive a moderately severe case as relatively mild, and impose a low sentence. Because judges in the juvenile
system tend to deal with a baseline of less-serious cases, cases right on
the borderline between going to juvenile court and regular criminal
court seem very serious. And because judges in the regular criminal
system have a baseline of more-serious crimes, those same cases, in
contrast to the rest of their docket, seem mild. 101
This is a clever hypothesis, but how do you test it? Without the
ability to “experiment” on real cases, this is an immensely hard question to answer empirically. If you try to compare juvenile courts and
regular courts, there are all sorts of differences that could potentially
explain a difference in outcomes: maybe different kinds of people become juvenile court judges versus regular criminal judges; maybe the
juvenile system has different procedural rules than the regular system; and so on. 102
What Leibovitch did is take advantage of what economists refer to
as a “natural experiment”—a situation where real-world circumstances have led to randomization roughly equivalent to the randomization
into treatment and control groups that would occur in a laboratory experiment. She collected data from the Pennsylvania state courts and
focused on a set of judges who were all elected in the same election
and who all served in the same courthouses and applied the same law,
in the same context, in the same communities, to the same pool of defendants. But—and this is a very important “but”—during their first
few months on the bench, just by random chance, some judges happened to get a mix of criminal cases with more serious crimes, while
other judges (just by random chance) happened to get a mix of criminal cases with less serious crimes. It was as if an experimenter was
randomly assigning some judges to see a baseline set of serious cases,
and other judges a baseline set of mild cases. 103
Of course, over time as more cases come through the door, the
caseloads of every judge will all average out to the same level. Once
the caseloads have evened out, Leibovitch asked: Did their exposure
during the first few months affect the sentences these judges gave? Do
judges with a baseline of serious cases give the same sentence as judges with a baseline of mild cases, when these judges are sentencing defendants for the exact same crime?
Id.
Id. at 283–84.
103 Id. at 291–93, 295–99.
101
102
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No. A judge that was exposed to a higher baseline will give a sentence 25% shorter for the same crime than the judge exposed to a lower baseline. 104 This is the contrast effects in action: not just in the laboratory, and not just at a collectibles convention, but in decisions affecting the incarceration of our fellow citizens.
B. Two Lessons
Do the behavioral biases that behavioral economics has identified
dominate the patterns of behavior that we see? Or do the predictions
of rational agent models used in neoclassical economics adequately
describe human behavior? The resounding, if unsatisfying, answer the
examples above give to both these questions is “sometimes.” Simply
because we detect a behavioral bias at the individual level does not
mean that we will see the same bias play out on a larger scale when
we aggregate the behavior of hundreds or thousands or millions of
people into a market, a society, or a political community. How individuals behave, acting alone in an experimental environment, may not
correspond to how economically and legally significant entities like
firms or government agencies behave. But it may. Just as an understanding of quantum tunneling is irrelevant to the game of basketball
but indispensable to mobile telecommunications, Newtonian economics gets the job done some, but not all, of the time.
This fact offers two lessons, one for neoclassical economists, and
one for behavioral economists. The first lesson is that, because behavioral phenomena can be significant at policy-relevant scales, any serious economic analysis must be sensitive to the potential role of behavioral factors. Sometimes, maybe most times, the Correspondence Principle will apply, and the predictions of a behaviorally influenced approach will be no different from a more parsimonious, neoclassical approach. Over the past few decades, much of the literature in neoclassical economics incorporated behavioral advances into more traditional
models. 105 Conversely, behavioral economists, acknowledging the success that neoclassical models have had in many areas, recognize that

Id. at 306.
See Daniel Kahneman, A Psychological Perspective on Economics, 93
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 162, 166 (May 2003), who also notes the limits
of this approach to synthesis.
104
105
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overlap between behavioral results and neoclassical predictions is a
feature, not a bug, of good economic theory. 106
This brings us to the second lesson: behavioral economics needs
theory. If the myriad empirical findings of behavioral economics can
begin to coalesce into a coherent theory of behavior, scholars and policymakers will be able to make more confident predictions about when
and how behavioral phenomena such as the endowment effect or the
contrast effect will matter at the scale of markets or courts, and when
they will not.
1. Lesson: We are all behavioral economists now. 107
An important lesson from our examination of quantum and Newtonian economics is that all economics is behavioral economics. Indeed, behavioral research brings economics back to its roots—all the
way back, to the likes of Adam Smith, who grounded his economic reasoning in thoughtful observation of not only the rational, but the moral and emotional motivations for real-life human action. The popular
association of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” with the notion of homo
economicus is perhaps the most profound misapprehension in economics. Smith himself considered his first monograph, The Theory of Moral Sentiments to be his greatest work. It begins with these words:
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him,
though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing
it. 108
Smith’s later, and far more famous, reference to, “not . . . the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, . . . but . . . their regard
Jessica L. Cohen and William T. Dickens, A Foundation for Behavioral
Economics, 92 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 336, 337 (May 2002) (“This view
of behavior is profoundly different from the standard view in economics but
often will not lead to different predictions. . . . this is a desirable characteristic of a behavioral framework since that model often predicts well.”).
107 Cf. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467
(1988) (“To some extent, we are all realists now.”); Elena Kagan and John
Manning, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the
Reading of Statues at 8:28 (Nov. 25, 2015), available at https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg (“[W]e are all textualists now.”).
108 Adam Smith, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 3 (Dover 2006 [6th ed.
1790]).
106
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to their own interest,” 109 has to be understood in this light. To be sure,
Smith saw self-interest as a primary motive force for the prosperity
created by markets. But the notion that humans are purely selfinterested would have been no less ridiculous to him than it is to us
today.
Hence, “behavioral economics” is, quite literally, neoclassical economics. It is making new the economics of Adam Smith and his contemporaries. But in the latter half of the Twentieth Century, the discipline of economics became increasing obsessed with sophisticated
mathematical modeling and formal proofs derived from mathematical
axioms that reflected strict assumptions about the nature of human
behavior. One could have forgiven the outside observer for mistaking
economics for a branch of applied mathematics. By exposing the absurdities of an excessive reliance on mathematical sophistication at
the expense of descriptive realism, behavioral economics has done all
of economics immeasurable good.
To be sure, neoclassical economics was never entirely blind to the
nuances of human cognition and emotion. Gary Becker, arguably the
greatest economist of the past century, used neoclassical models, but
always with the express purpose of untangling the complexities and
foibles of real-world human behavior. In the view of Becker and his
countless protégés (I will count myself as one of them), homo economicus is altruistic, makes mistakes, yields to peer pressure, feels loss
aversion, and even succumbs to addiction. 110
Ironically, the icon of neoclassical law and economics (but whipping boy of behavioral law and economics), Ronald Coase, would have
been the first to say that the messy reality of human interactions
would lead real-world behavior to deviate from the predictions of simplistic mathematical models. In fact, he was the first to say this: this
is the thesis of The Nature of the Firm, 111 and he won a Nobel Prize for
it. 112

Adam Smith, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
(Hartford 1818 11th ed.).
110 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES (Harvard 1996).
111 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 386 (1937).
112 Strictly speaking, Coase won the 1991 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel “for his discovery and clarification
of the significance of transaction costs and property rights for the institutional structure and functioning of the economy.” The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in
Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991, available at
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1991/.
109
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Unfortunately, this fact has been lost on a generation of students
of behavioral law and economics, due to an out-of-context focus on the
so-called Coase Theorem, which is often stated along these lines: “In a
world of zero transaction costs, the initial allocation of legal entitlements does not matter from an efficiency perspective.” Behavioral law
and economics scholars, even those as eminent as Cass Sunstein, have
claimed that Coase won a Nobel Prize for the Coase Theorem and that
“behavioral law and economics shows that the Coase Theorem is often
wrong.” 113
This is inaccurate, as Coase won his Nobel Prize for his work on
property rights and the theory of the firm. In fact, Coase did not even
come up with the Coase Theorem. The author of the Coase Theorem
was George Stigler, a point Coase himself was keen to emphasize. 114
But more importantly, this claim that behavioral economics refutes
the Coase Theorem misunderstands Coase’s contribution. Coase had
no interest in a world of zero transaction costs, any more than he had
interest in understanding a world populated by unicorns and leprechauns. Those worlds don’t exist. 115
The thrust of Coase’s insights in The Nature of the Firm 116 and The
Problem of Social Cost117 was that we can understand deviations from
market structures and efficient private ordering if we understand

Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 2 (Cass
R. Sunstein, ed. Cambridge 2000).
114 See Ronald H. Coase, Centennial Coase Lecture, available online at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/video/coase040103 (“[The Problem of Social
Cost] was a great success. It helped to create the modern subject of Law and
Economics; it has been cited more than any other article in the modern economics literature. However, much of this attention does not relate to what I
said in that article, but to something called the Coase Theorem. This was invented by George Stigler.”). As an aside, this misattribution is an example of
Stigler’s Law, which is that “No scientific discovery is named after its original
discoverer.” Stephen M. Stigler, Stigler’s Law of Eponymy, 39 TRANSACTIONS
OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 147, 147 (1980). As Stephen Stigler
explains, Stigler’s Law was discovered by Robert Merton. Id.
115 See Coase, supra note 114 (“Of course, in making one’s argument, it’s quite
all right to simplify, but this has to be done sensibly. . . . [Yet] people didn’t
say, ‘Oh, we’re neglecting the effect of transaction costs in this particular
transaction.’ They said, ‘In a world of zero transaction costs,’ which is . . . a
world that couldn’t exist.”).
116 Coase, supra note 111.
117 Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS 1 (1960).
113
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transaction costs, and we sometimes improve markets and social welfare by reducing transaction costs.
But what are transaction costs? What are the costs that prevent
the reallocation by contract of initial endowments to their most valuable uses? Well, there are obvious ones, such as the time and money
required to find a buyer or seller, but cognitive phenomena such as the
endowment effect also create frictions that inhibit value-increasing
exchanges. In this way, behavioral insights naturally integrate themselves into familiar, neoclassical frameworks.
Even more broadly, one can apply the central tenet of neoclassical
economics, the Law of Demand, to generate hypotheses about when
behavioral biases are more likely to manifest themselves. To quote
Coase: “when the price of being irrational is very high, people don’t do
much of it.” 118 This brings us to the second lesson: behavioral law and
economics, no less than neoclassical law and economics, needs theory.
2. Lesson: Build the theory of quantum law and economics.
Behavioral economics has thoroughly succeeded in undermining
our confidence in economic analysis based on the unreflective assumption that homo economicus is an adequate model for human behavior.
But to date, the achievements of behavioral economics have been
largely negative—showing what is not the case, rather than providing
a superior alternative to guide our analysis. 119 This is a striking
disanalogy between behavioral economics and quantum physics.
Quantum physics has a (nearly) comprehensive theory of the behavior
of the physical world at the nanoscale.
This lack of theory threatens to render behavioral economics incoherent or even self-defeating. The voluminous and rich literature detailing behavioral heuristics and biases leads to a wide range of predictions—sometimes conflicting predictions—about human behavior.
Ronald H. Coase, Coase, supra note 114. See also Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1,
12–13 (1962).
119 See Mitchell, supra note 24, at 77 (noting that behavioral law and economics “usefully directs attention to the behavioral assumptions underlying the
law, it presently offers little helpful guidance about how to amend prevailing
assumptions”); Cohen and Dickens, supra note 106, at 335 (“[Behavioral economics] has been most successful in documenting failures of the rationalactor model (e.g., failures of expected-utility theory, irrational cooperation,
and time-inconsistent preferences). However, attempts to incorporate these
observations into theory have been ad hoc.”).
118
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Unlike neoclassical economics, which has as its unifying concept rational behavior and its unifying prediction the Law of Demand, behavioral economics does not yet have a unifying theoretical framework. As
a consequence, what we have at this point is a dizzying array of heuristics, biases, and other cognitive quirks that have been identified
through myriad experiments. For example, the Wikipedia page called
“List of Cognitive Biases” names 169 different biases. 120 Not surprisingly, some of these biases cut in opposite directions. I’ve already noted the “contrast effect,” which leads people to move their quantitative
judgments away from a given baseline. But what about the “anchoring
effect,” which leads people to move their quantitative judgments toward a previously observed baseline? How then are we supposed to
use behavioral economics to predict future behavior?
This is not a fanciful concern. Seminal experimental work on judge
and jury decisionmaking has emphasized that the anchoring effects
draws judicial sentences and jury verdicts closer to irrelevant anchors. 121 Based on these findings on the anchoring effect, we might
think that the irrelevant baseline set by low sentences in earlier cases
will lead real-world judges to set sentences relatively low. Yet Leibovitch finds exactly the opposite: the contrast effect leads real-world
judges who observe a baseline of low sentences to set sentences relatively high. More generally, with 169 biases to choose from, and precious little data on behavior is real-world settings, what is a policymaker to do? The danger is that scholars and policymakers will simply
pick and choose among biases, basing policy recommendations on arbitrary subsamples of potentially relevant behavioral phenomena. 122
Wikipedia,
List
of
Cognitive
Biases,
available
at
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases.
121 See Birte Englich and Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty:
Anchoring Effects in the Courtroom, 31 JOURNAL OF APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1535, 1546 (2001); McCaffery, Kahneman and Spitzer, supra note
98, at 1385.
122 “The lack of theoretical foundations causes a number of problems for BE
[behavioral economics]. First, empirical analysis can show the inadequacy of
mainstream theory, but it does little to help develop alternatives. Second,
without a coherent theory it is difficult to develop new applications. Third,
the policy influence of [behavioral economics] is limited by its inability to
predict circumstances in which anomalous behavior will arise (other than
those sorts of circumstances in which it has been observed before) or how it
will respond to policy changes. Finally, it is hard to judge the welfare implications of policy if we do not understand the origins of such behavior.” Cohen
and Dickens, supra note 106, at 335.
120
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This is why more holistic theories of behavior are necessary. And
there is nothing inherent in the behavioral approach that forecloses a
more unified, theory-driven approach. Indeed, Kahneman and
Tversky’s 1979 Econometrica piece, which is perhaps the seminal work
in behavioral economics, did not merely present empirical evidence of
loss aversion, but developed and presented an explicit, formal theory
(“prospect theory”) that could be used to generate predictions about
how loss aversion would affect behavior across many contexts. 123 Prospect theory was not a rejection of formal theory, but a call for better
theory, theory in which individuals optimize their utility based on biased and loss-averse preferences.
In sum, the findings of behavioral economics are numerous and
varied, but this rich array of results is both a blessing and a curse.
People are overly optimistic, which causes them to behave in riskseeking ways; but people have loss aversion, which causes them to behave in risk-averse ways. There is an anchoring effect, which causes
estimates to be biased toward initial baselines; but there is a contrast
effect, which causes estimates to be biased away from initial baselines.
Without a theory connecting these ideas, how do we know which of
these opposite forces will predominate in response to a new law?
This brings us to the third concept from quantum physics, the
Quantum Principle. It offers the basis for a conjecture that the concept
of quanta may offer a fruitful direction for theory that will help unify
disparate empirical results in behavioral economics.
VI. A QUANTUM CONJECTURE FOR BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
To say a theory would help is not to provide a theory. Further,
human decisionmaking and behavior is far too complex to be reduced
to a single, comprehensive theory. But behavioral economists, going
back to the earliest work in the field, have attempted to make progress
toward a firmer theoretical grounding for the field. 124 In that spirit, I
offer here a (very tentative) conjecture that may provide a direction for
future theory in behavioral economics.
We perceive our own cognition, effort, and attention in a Newtonian way: smoothly and continuously adjustable, such that I can think a
Kahneman and Tversky, supra note 30, at 274–77.
See id.; Cohen and Dickens, supra note 106, at 337 (“This view of behavior
is profoundly different from the standard view in economics but often will not
lead to different predictions. . . . [T]his is a desirable characteristic of a behavioral framework since that model often predicts well.”).
123
124
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little bit harder or work a little bit less on any particular task. Newtonian mechanics—and Newtonian economics—assumes that this is exactly how the world works. It is perhaps no coincidence that the primary mathematical tool for both Isaac Newton’s laws of motion and
Gary Becker’s price theory is calculus, a technique that generates elegant solutions to complex problems by conceptually breaking every
curve or shape down into infinitely small bits.
As noted above, this isn’t quite true in physics. Quantum mechanics concerns itself with quanta: small, but discrete and indivisible
quantities. What if quantum economics did, too? I suggest what I will
call the Quantum Conjecture: human cognition occurs in discrete
quanta. People have a finite set of packets of attention or energy that
cannot be subdivided as the occasion warrants. 125
Consider the notion of the “tyranny of choice.” Having too many
options may be paralyzing rather than liberating. The conventional
wisdom in neoclassical economics is that giving people an additional
option always makes them better off—or at least no worse off. After
all, if they don’t like the new option, they can simply do what they
were doing before; and if they do like the new option, then they are
strictly better off. Yet personal experience, if not behavioral research, 126 tells us that often, things are not so simple.
As options multiply, we cannot simply divide and further subdivide
our attention and cognitive effort among an ever-growing list of priorities. It seems as though there is a minimum, indivisible quantum of
attention that we can deploy. As a consequence, some tasks or options
To be clear, this conjecture is a positive claim about behavior, not a descriptive claim. I do not assert that human attention or energy actually takes
the form of packets, but rather that human behavior might be better understood with a model that assumes we behave as if our cognition could only be
parceled into indivisible packets. In this sense, the Quantum Conjecture
hews to the neoclassical approach to modeling. See Milton Friedman, The
Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3
(1953)).
126 The “choice overload hypothesis”—that increasing the number of choices
will reduce willingness to choose or satisfaction with a choice made—has
been the subject of many studies seeming to confirm the phenomenon. But it
has not been consistently confirmed as an empirical matter. See Benjamin
Scheibehenne, Rainer Greifeneder, and Peter M. Todd, Can There Ever Be
Too Many Options? A Meta-Analytic Review of Choice-Overload, 37 JOURNAL
OF CONSUMER RESEARCH 409, 421 (Oct. 2010) (finding that the effect of increasing the number options, estimated in 50 separate experiments, was on
average almost exactly zero, but noting substantial variation in results across
studies).
125
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receive a packet of our attention, while other options are ignored, even
if, in a Newtonian world, we could spread our attention evenly and
ever more thinly across all of these options.
I would argue that one manifestation of this is the “certainty effect,” which was identified long ago by Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman. 127 People would rather eliminate a small risk (thereby reducing total risk by a small amount) than to drastically limit, but not
eliminate, a large risk (thereby reducing total risk by a large amount).
This is a terrible policy preference, but there is a logic to it. Reducing
the big risk leaves one with just as many risks to worry about as before. Eliminating a small risk reduces the number of discrete topics
one need to think about. Life has become simpler; the cognitive burden
of attending to risk has been relieved, and mental faculties have been
freed up for other tasks. More generally, the cognitive load imposed by
decisionmaking and multitasking is deceptively high. 128 It is a kind of
internal transaction cost that introduces a huge amount of friction into human decisionmaking.
The idea that consideration of options or information is costly to
people is in fact a familiar one in neoclassical economics, too. Although
traditional rational choice models would often ignore such cognitive
costs, a considerable modern literature incorporates such costs into
the study of decisionmaking. A nice example of this is Benjamin
Lester, Nicola Persico, and Ludo Visschers, Information Acquisition
and the Exclusion of Evidence in Trials, 129 which uses the fact that
processing information imposes a cognitive cost to explain the contours of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which gives the judge discretion
to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by “unfair
prejudice.” 130 Their model assumes that jurors are “fully rational” but
are “cognitive misers” because processing information is burdensome. 131 In this way, they can deploy a set of theoretical tools familiar

Kahneman and Tversky, supra note 30, at 265. See also John W. Pratt and
Richard J. Zeckhauser, Willingness to Pay and the Distribution of Risk and
Wealth, 104 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 747, 748 (Aug. 1996).
128 See, e.g., Susan Weinschenk, The True Cost Of Multi-Tasking, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Sep 18, 2012), available at https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/
brain-wise/201209/the-true-cost-multi-tasking (“Recent estimates are that
you can lose up to 40% of your productivity if you multi-task.”).
129 28 JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION 163 (2009).
130 Id. at 163 & n.1.
131 Id. at 164. They provide some useful citations to the cognitive psychology
literature on the “cognitive miser” phenomenon. Id.
127
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to “Newtonian” economists, but in a way that recognizes the “quantum” reality of human behavior.
In the remainder of this Part, I present three examples of disparate phenomena—involving consumer protection, public health, and
environmental regulation—which I argue might be explained by a single, simple analytical framework, a quantum approach to behavioral
law and economics. I then draw two lessons from this excursion into a
“quantum” theory for behavioral law and economics. First, it reveals
the symbiotic, complementary relationship between neoclassical and
behavioral economics. The notion that these are competing paradigms
for analysis is not only mistaken but deeply misguided. For many important policy problems, it is simply not possible to undertake sensible
analysis without utilizing both behavioral insights and price theory in
tandem. Second, recognizing the interrelationships between behavioral and neoclassical economics also explodes one of the most stubborn
myths in law and economics: that neoclassical economics is a reflection
of conservative or anti-regulatory ideologies, and that behavioral economics caters to progressive or pro-regulatory ideologies. Not only is
this wrong as a conceptual matter—economics is methodology, not
ideology—it is wrong as a predictive matter. Neoclassical economics
can point toward more regulation, and behavioral economics can counsel for less.
A. Three (Possible) Examples
Here, I offer three examples of the wide array of phenomena that
might be amenable to analysis in a unified theoretical framework built
around the idea of quanta of attention. The examples below are
straightforward and familiar, and surely one could invoke many others. 132 The value of these examples is not that a “quantum theory”
would predict these outcomes—such a result is both obvious and superfluous. Rather, the point of the exercise is to show that a single set
of theoretical assumptions can explain a wide range of otherwise disconnected phenomena. It is precisely this effort—to unify disparate
I also note potential connections of the quantum concept here to Lee Fennell’s work on lumpiness in law. See Lee Anne Fennell, Slicing Spontaneity,
100 IOWA L. REV. 2365, 2368 (2015); Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160
U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 1956 (2012). The object of study in Fennell’s work is not
lumpiness in cognition or attention, but lumpiness in activities or legal entitlements. Some activity levels are lumpy—you either go to the state fair or
you don’t—while other activities can vary along a continuum—you can buy as
many or few tickets as you want for rides once you get to the state fair.
132
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findings in a common framework that allows us to make predictions
about outcomes not yet observed—that behavioral law and economics
requires more of.
I will briefly note, too, that if a theory based on the quantum concept is valid, it should explain findings from the neoclassical economic
literature as well. Implicit in the conjecture, therefore, is the claim
that not only does the Quantum Conjecture gel with many behavioral
experimental findings, it harmonizes them with many empirical findings in the more traditional economics literature. I’ll note two examples here. First, econometric estimates of the returns to higher education are so high that the fact that anyone doesn’t go to college can only
be rationalized by assuming that the psychic costs of attending college
are very high. 133 Second, neoclassical theories explaining the extraordinary rates of CEO pay can only be rationalized if one assumes that
juggling a large number of cognitive tasks is extraordinarily difficult. 134 These outcomes are easily explained by a model of cognition
built around scarce quanta of attention.
1. The futility of increasing disclosures.
A simple and plausible application of the Quantum Conjecture
would be to mandatory disclosures. Much of the policy-oriented work
in behavioral law and economics is directed toward to improving consumer choice through mandated disclosures of relevant information to
consumers. 135 But one of the more sobering findings in the literature
on disclosure is that most mandated disclosures are, at best, ineffective, and at worst, counterproductive. 136 As scholars in this area have
recognized, consumers lack either the inclination or the cognitive capacity (or both) to process the numerous disclosures attached to a
product or service. A neoclassical model of disclosures might predict
that the effectiveness of disclosures would decline smoothly, as an inDavid Card, Estimating the Return to Schooling: Progress on Some Persistent Econometric Problems, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1127, 1145–55 (2001).
134 See, e.g., Joan Woodward, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 17–34 (Oxford 1965); Oriana Bandiera, et al, Span of Control and Span
of Attention, Harvard Business School Working Paper 12-053 (April 2014),
available
at
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/12053_5de59810-1c7a-4101-a58b-309376366347.pdf.
135 Ryan Bubb and Richard H. Pildes, supra note 40; Oren Bar-Gill, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 32 (2012).
136 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, MORE THAN YOU
WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
133
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dividual’s attention is gradually spread more and more thinly across
disclosures. A “quantum” model of disclosures might predict that the
first few disclosures will have some level of effectiveness, but any additional disclosures will have no effect; the notion is that once the consumer’s quanta of attention are entirely divided up amongst the various disclosures and other product attributes, the consumer is simply
unable to allocate attention to additional disclosures.
2. GMOs, health, and the environment.
Many people avoid foods containing GMOs (genetically modified
organisms) out of fear of the effects of GMOs on their health or on the
environment. Widespread calls to mandate labeling of GMO food have
led to legislation directing the FDA issue regulations on GMO labeling. 137 This is despite a scientific consensus that GMOs pose no threat
to human health and a near-consensus that they pose little or no risk
to the environment. 138 One way to explain this alarmist reaction to
these new food products is by reference to the certainty effect: because
of their novelty, any risks of GMOs are unquantified and people seek
the certainty of zero risk from GMOs.
The “behavioral” regulatory response to this would be to deny such
calls for mandated labeling. Interestingly, although the rationale is
paternalistic, this is an example of a paternalistic response to a behavioral bias leading to a deregulatory, rather than pro-regulatory, policy
recommendation.
Conversely, a “neoclassical” analysis of consumers’ response to
GMO foods would focus on price effects and the Law of Demand. This
could lead to a different, aggressively regulatory recommendation.
Here is the logic: producing healthy food without GMOs raises the
price of that food, reducing its consumption; therefore, consumer aversion to GMOs actually makes healthy food less affordable. And avoiding crops genetically modified to be drought- and pest-resistant means
reliance on crops that require increased consumption of scarce water
resources and greater use of pesticides—both of which harm the environment. These negative externalities that opponents of GMOs impose
on public health and the environment externalities could justify government intervention in favor of GMOs, rather government inaction.
Cass R. Sunstein, On Mandatory Labeling, With Special Reference to Genetically Modified Foods, University of Pennsylvania Law Review (Forthcoming), 4.
138 Id. at 24–25.
137
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3. Regulatory overkill.
Nor is government immune to overreactions to risks. Kip Viscusi’s
body of work on the cost-effectiveness of regulation has shown again
and again how regulatory programs to eliminate risks that are already
vanishingly small lead to regulatory costs of billions or even trillions
of dollars on a per-life-saved basis. 139 Such costs would be better
spent—thereby saving thousands of lives—regulating in areas where
the risks to human life are far greater, but can’t be reduced to zero. As
Government, it seems, suffers from the certainty effect, or at least
many of its regulatory policies seem to cater to a public bias in favor of
certainty. 140
A notable example of this appears in United States v. Ottati &
Goss, Inc., 141 where the Environmental Protection Agency appealed a
district court order in its favor ordering the defendant corporation to
clean up a “Superfund” site contaminated by various pollutants including, as relevant here, a carcinogen called PCB. 142 Although the
district court required that the defendant ensure that the site meet a
standard of no more than 50 parts per million of PCB in the soil,
EPA’s appeal sought a stricter standard of no more than 20 ppm, steps
that EPA’s own studies estimated would cost nearly $10 million. 143
The rationale for such strict measures rested on the assumptions that
“a) developers will build residential housing on the site, b) small children, playing in the backyard, will eat dirt containing PCBs, and c)
the children will eat a little bit of dirt each day for 245 days per year
for three and a half years.” 144 As Justice Breyer, who wrote the opinion as a Circuit Judge, would later express puzzlement at, 145 the
weakness of this argument was that the site to cleaned up was an unSee, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, RATIONAL RISK POLICY (Oxford 1998); W. Kip
Viscusi and James Hamilton, Are Risk Regulators Rational?, 89 AMERICAN
ECONOMIC REVIEW 1010, 1022–23 (1999).
140 W. Kip Viscusi and Ted Gayer, Behavioral Public Choice: The Behavioral
Paradox of Government Policy, Vanderbilt University Law School Law and
Economics
Working
Paper
No.
15-2,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2559408, at 19.
141 900 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1990).
142 Id. at 441. See Viscusi and Gayer, supra note 140, for a more extended discussion.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Stephen Breyer, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 11–12 (Harvard 1993).
139
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inhabited marsh. 146 The only way to rationalize such a policy by the
EPA was desire to reduce this one risk to zero, no matter how vanishingly small it would be otherwise, and no matter the cost.
B. Two Lessons
1. Lesson: Behavioral and neoclassical economics are complements, not substitutes.
As the GMO example above illustrates, behavioral and neoclassical
forces are always operating together. Behavioral biases drive consumer behavior, thereby influencing supply and demand in any given
market. Thus, behavioral economics and neoclassical economics are
best understood as complements rather than substitutes; they are
partners, not rivals. 147
In a recent article, Ryan Bubb and Patrick Warren provide a highstakes, real-world example of how combining behavioral insights with
neoclassical theory can improve regulatory efforts. 148 They study employer-sponsored retirement savings plans, a subject of must discussion in the literature on “nudges” due to the widespread recognition
that employees seem to systematically underinvest in retirement savings. 149 One of the best-known policy recommendation in behavioral
economics—one that has actually been heeded by Congress—is for
employers to “paternalistically harness the stickiness of default rules
. . . to counteract myopic workers’ temptation to save too little.” 150 Legislation has encouraged employers to create automatic enrollment
plans that set default contribution rates for their employees, so long as
the employer sets a sufficiently high contribution rate. Yet despite the
widespread adoption of automatic enrollment plans, Bubb and Warren
report that overall retirement savings rates have not risen (and in fact
may have fallen) as a result of the reforms. 151
Ottati & Goss, 900 F.2d at 442.
For more examples of the importance of understanding how simple applications of neoclassical analysis can identify unintended consequences of behavioral regulation, including a discussion of the perhaps the most famous
example of this, the “Peltzman effect,” see W. Kip Viscusi and Ted Gayer, supra, note 139, at 32 & n.84.
148 Ryan Bubb and Patrick L. Warren, An Equilibrium Theory of Retirement
Plan Design (working paper) (Sept. 2, 2016).
149 Id. at 1.
150 Id. at 1–2.
151 Id. at 3 (citing Bubb and Pildes, supra note 40.)
146
147
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This outcome should be alarming to anyone optimistic about the
role behavioral economics can play in improving regulation. The poster child for “libertarian paternalism”—the use of sticky defaults to improve individual saving decisions—seems to have utterly failed. Why?
Behavioral insights describing individual behavior need to be
placed in the context of market behavior. In the retirement savings
plan context, Bubb and Warren explain how this plays out. 152 Simplified somewhat, their argument goes like this: Given employers who
attempt to maximize their profits, and a workforce that contains both
forward-looking and myopic workers, employers will structure their
retirement plans to attract both types of workers at the lowest cost.
Workers are attracted to employers who offer to match all employee
contributions; all workers predict that they will contribute to the retirement savings plan at the maximum rate, and thus reap the generous employer matching contributions. In the case of myopic employees, however, their forecast is wrong: once employed, they will only
contribute at the default rate. Thus, profit-maximizing employers will
offer generous matching contributions (to attract both types of workers), but set relatively low default contribution rates (to save money on
myopic workers, because they only have to match the default
amount). 153
Put simply: the policy intervention got the behavioral economics
right, but the neoclassical economics wrong. The result was policy that
appears to be worse than if the government had done nothing at all.
2. Lesson: Economics is methodology, not ideology.
The GMO example also reminds us not to confuse methodology
with ideology. In that example, we see a reversal of the usual trope
about behavioral economics overturning the neo-classical skepticism
toward government regulation. More generally, neither neoclassical
nor behavioral economics incorporates any specific beliefs about the
proper role of government or the scope of paternalism. They are simply tools for understanding how people behave. Sometimes we’ll learn
Their analysis is buttressed by a formal, neoclassical model of employer
behavior. Id. at 5–18. The model is not necessary for the intuition I offer in
the text above, but the model generates crisp empirical predictions, which
one can test with data, and therefore assess the predictive validity of the
model. Bubb and Ryan are, in fact, able to confirm the predictions of their
model. Id. at 18–19. This model is an elegant example of how behavioral and
neoclassical analysis can be synthesized into better theory.
153 Id. at 2–4.
152
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something from them that leads us toward more regulation; sometimes less.
Interacting behavioral and neoclassical economic analysis will
sometimes lead one in the direction of more assertive regulation. In a
prominent recent article, Ryan Bubb and Richard Pildes give examples of how popular policy prescriptions, such as the sticky default
rules in the context of retirement savings plans described above, can
be ineffective or even backfire: “choice-preserving regulatory tools are
particularly weak medicine, we argue, when firms have incentives to
undermine consumer choice. Instead, the interaction of optimizing
firms with nonoptimizing consumers might better suggest traditional
regulatory tools, such as product regulation, as well as measures designed to lower the incentives of firms to exploit consumer mistakes.” 154 In other words, adding consideration of market incentives
and price theory to the mix leads Bubb and Pildes to favor heavierhanded regulation.
The interaction of behavioral and neoclassical economics can cut
the other way, too. While consumers are prone to cognitive biases,
“policymakers are also human” and thus also prone to cognitive biases
when making policy. 155 Taking into account the incentives of consumers in the market versus the incentives of voters or officials might lead
us to worry less about “market failures” and more about “government
failures.” In market settings, market discipline makes biases costly; to
the extent that consumers succumb to biases in market transactions,
they pay the price (either literally or figuratively). 156 While market
settings don’t transform individuals into homo economicus, we saw
above that market experience 157 and the assistance of intermediaries
in transactions 158 dramatically reduce behavioral phenomena such as
the endowment effect. But when consumers vote, what incentive does
an individual have to debias himself? The winner of the election will
not depend on his vote. 159
Further, government actors are not subject to market discipline—
and in the case of judges, they may not even be subject to electoral
discipline. Think back to the study of contrast effects in criminal sentencing. Judges exercise a monopoly on criminal sentencing, of course,
Bubb and Pildes, supra note 40, at 1600.
Viscusi and Gayer, supra note 140, at 5.
156 Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133,
139 (2006).
157 See notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
158 See notes 90–95 and accompanying text.
159 Glaeser, supra note 156, at 139–42, 146–48.
154
155
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and thus there are no market forces that make it costly for judges to
behave in biased ways. While there will be many cases in which we
must call upon government officials to ameliorate the effects of behavioral biases, the behavioral biases most likely to go unchecked may be
those manifested by government officials themselves.
In short, economics isn’t ideology. Neoclassical economics, with its
focus on externalities and market failures, often provides grounds for
ambitious regulatory agendas. 160 Behavioral economics, which catalogs the fallibility of human judgment in contexts where biases and
heuristics are undisciplined by market forces, raises concerns about
displacing private ordering with government regulation. 161
VII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have drawn a set of three analogies between physics and economics, with the objective of illuminating the relationship
between behavioral and neoclassical law and economics.
Behavioral law and economics has its own Uncertainty Principle:
in laboratory experiments, the act of observation changes the behavior
of the observed subject. This is not a fatal weakness, but rather a
principle that offers two lessons: First, the limits of neoclassical theory
to authentically describe reality must be weighed against the limits of
behavioral experiments to do the same thing. Second, the future of behavioral law and economics lies in an increasing emphasis on field experiments, or at least laboratory experiments designed to capture realistic feature of the institutional contexts provided by the legal system.
The Correspondence Principle tells us that neoclassical economics
is wrong, but it nonetheless remains a good approximation for human
behavior at the scale of human society—at least most of the time. It,
too, offers two lessons: First, all economics is behavioral economics;
the rational-actor assumptions of neoclassical economics are best understood not as a rejection of a more complete understanding of human cognition, but as a set of simplifying assumptions that are often
desirable when studying behavior in settings such as markets. But to
advance, neoclassical economics must continue to incorporate insights
from behavioral economics. Second, for behavioral economics to be
more relevant to policy, it needs a theoretical framework that explains

Cf. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Toward a Pigouvian State, 164
U. PA. L. REV. 93, 100–04 (2015).
161 Glaeser, supra note 156, at143–47.
160
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when and how it applies outside of laboratory settings, and at scales
relevant to policy.
The Quantum Conjecture is an effort to draw an additional metaphor from quantum physics, one that may provide a conceptual nucleus for a tractable but broadly applicable theory in behavioral economics. This third metaphor offers a third pair of lessons: First, behavioral
and neoclassical approaches are complements, not substitutes, and
should be employed in tandem. Second, the simplistic view that neoclassical economics is anti-regulatory and behavioral economics is proregulatory ignores the longstanding grounds for regulatory intervention identified by neoclassical economics, but also (and less obviously)
the potentially profound critique of government intervention that behavioral economics suggests.
Finally, I note that as remote as this examination of behavioral
law and economics may seem from the everyday lawyering, the findings I have discussed above go to the heart of legal practice. Consider
Arlen and Tontrup’s demonstration of the importance of intermediaries in debiasing individual decisionmakers. That study shows that
even unsophisticated intermediaries performing trivial tasks have a
dramatic effect on removing what would otherwise appear to be irrational behavior from transactions. Of course, in real life transactions
are vastly more complicated, but then again, agents in real life are
vastly more sophisticated. And agents in real life are, of course, lawyers. The practice of law itself is perhaps the most ambitious application of behavioral economics yet underway.
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